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ABSTRACT
Agile methodologies are becoming widespread in modern
software development. However, due to a lack of safety
assurance activities, agile methods are criticized for being
inadequate for the development of safe software. Safety
analysis and safety verification are complementary methods
for safety assurance. Yet, both usually rely on traditional,
waterfall-like processes. Therefore, it is strongly needed to
integrate an appropriate safety analysis approach into agile
software development processes driving architecture design
and verify the safe design at the code level.
This paper presents a novel agile process model “S-Scrum”
based on the existing development process “Safe Scrum” and
extended by a safety analysis method and a safety verifica-
tion approach based on STPA (System-Theoretic Process
Analysis).
The proposed agile development process S-Scrum can be
separated into three parts: (1) performing safety-guided de-
sign by STPA inside each sprint; (2) verifying safety re-
quirements at the code level by using model checking; (3)
replacing traditional RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Main-
tainability, Safety) validation on the final product by STPA
safety analysis. We adopt other aspects from the original
Safe Scrum.
Finally, the feasibility of S-Scrum is illustrated with the
example of an airbag system.
CCS Concepts
•Software and its engineering → Agile software de-
velopment; Software safety; Requirements analysis; For-
mal software verification;
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1. INTRODUCTION
This is a revised version. The original version of this paper you can find
under http://dx.doi.org/10.18419/opus-8926.
Agile has gained a good reputation for its higher customer
satisfaction, lower defect rates, faster development times and
as a solution to rapidly changing requirements [8]. Never-
theless, there are still limitations of agile processes for devel-
oping safety-critical software [26]. Although agile methods
highlight improving quality, the quality control mechanisms
have not proven to be adequate to assure that the product
is safe.
For engineering safety in agile methods, most researchers
prefer to combine this lightweight approach with traditional
development processes relying on safety standards, like ISO
26262 [18] and IEC 61508 [10]. They attempt to balance dis-
cipline and agility as the solution for safety-critical systems
[8]. However, a continuously changing architecture design
makes this balance the bottleneck. Architecture acts as a
vital role in the basic safety strategy for traditional safety
assurance. Without a stable architecture in agile develop-
ment processes, little safety analysis works well. Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA) are two classic safety analysis methods, yet both of
them need an up-front architecture design. STPA, however,
advocates safety-guided design. It is a novel safety analysis
approach proposed by Leveson [20], for the purpose of iden-
tifying safety requirements and constraints at the system
level, to drive a safe design. It has been successfully used
in a lot of domains [1] [7] [12], and shown to be more effec-
tive and efficient than classic methods [4]. A novel software
safety analysis and verification method based on STPA is
proposed in [3]. Abdulkhaleq, Wagner, and Leverson then
extend it to a comprehensive safety engineering approach
[5], which motivates us to apply the method to an existing
agile process for safety-critical systems−Safe Scrum. We
concentrate on integrating STPA-based safety analysis and
safety verification of the safety engineering approach into
agile methods. The proposed agile development process in
our paper is still in the concept stage, we name it “S-Scrum”
for further exploration and investigation.
Problem Statement: Although there exist a lot of domain-
specific safety standards for development processes, they are
all based on traditional sequential development processes
and do not mandate any specific safety assurance activities.
Safety analysis and safety verification are mentioned as two
critical safety assurance activities. However, current safety
analysis technologies are inadequate for agile methodologies
due to a lack of a stable architecture design. Thus, it is an
uncultivated land for exploring and integrating an appro-
priate safety analysis and safety verification technology into
agile methods.
Research Objectives: The overall objective of our ar-
ticle is to fill the gap on safety assurance activities in agile
software development processes by integrating a novel safety
analysis and verification approach based on STPA into the
existing agile process model Safe Scrum. We aim to enhance
the handling of safety of the original Safe Scrum, while we
increase the agility at the same time. We keep Scrum adher-
ent to safety standards by adopting Safe Scrum and improve
the agility of Safe Scrum by using STPA.
Contributions: We propose a novel agile development
process S-Scrum by integrating a safety analysis and verifi-
cation approach in Safe Scrum.
1. We perform safety-guided design in an agile way by
integrating STPA into each sprint before reaching the
design level in Safe Scrum.
2. We integrate a formal verification method with model
checking into Safe Scrum to formalize and verify the
safety requirements of STPA at the code level.
3. We replace traditional RAMS validation in Safe Scrum
by STPA on the product increment.
2. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, there exists little research
published on the utilization of safety analysis technologies
and also formal verification in agile methodologies. Thus,
we separate the related work into two sections. First, we
demonstrate the state of using agile methodologies in safety-
critical domains. Second, we introduce existing work on
mapping formal methods into agile technologies for safety
requirements verification.
Safe Scrum, proposed by St˚alhale and Myklebust [25], is
motivated by the need to make it possible to use methods
that are flexible with respect to planning, documentation
and specification while still being acceptable to IEC 61508,
as well as making Scrum a practically useful approach for
developing safety-critical systems. Safe Scrum is a consid-
erable success for its innovative combination. However, too
much adherence to the safety standard IEC 61508 makes
the process lacking agility. First, all the additional safety
assurance activities are kept outside Scrum. Second, each
sprint in Scrum should be swarming rather than sequential
as mini waterfall or mini V-model [22]. We believe that
safety-guided design is strongly needed in agile methods in-
stead of the purely “add-on” safety assurance.
Although Safe Scrum has not mentioned any safety anal-
ysis method, Lauritsen and St˚alhale [19] did preliminary
guided research on generally integrating two FMEA activi-
ties (Functional FMEA and Detailed FMEA) into RUP and
XP. In 2016, St˚alhale and Myklebust introduced agile safety
analysis [24]. However, most of their research focuses on the
connection between user stories and FMEA, not the whole
agile software development process.
In addition, Ge, Paige and McDermid [14] published an
iterative approach to develop safety-critical software. Vuori
[27] proposed a hybrid model like Safe Scrum. However,
both of them suggest an up-front design, which is contrary
to the nature of Scrum [9]. Gary et al. [13] mentioned
design for safety in agile methods in their paper, but no
safety analysis technology is explored.
In comparison to the above references, we apply an ap-
propriate safety analysis technique, STPA, in agile meth-
ods, to abandon this heavy weight architecture up-front and
still keep safety in agile. Moreover, the safety requirements
should be captured into the code.
A lot of research has integrated agile practices with formal
methods, but little of them connects their formal verification
approaches with any safety analysis methods.
Shafiq and Minhas [23] proposed integrating formal verifi-
cation from the requirement specifications using automated
code driven test. However, the verification for safety require-
ments is mostly not automated like functional requirements
[16]. Eleftherakis and Cowling [11] proposed a lightweight
formal development process “XFun”. Ghezzi et al. [15] sug-
gested an agile verification environment “AGAVE” that en-
ables developers to use model checking. Both of them men-
tioned the need to support safety analysis. Therefore, we
select the appropriate approach STPA to drive safe design,
and integrate STPA-based model checking for safety verifi-
cation.
3. BACKGROUND
3.1 STPA
We suggest STPA to confront the aforementioned prob-
lems. It is a new hazard analysis technique based on sys-
tems thinking and a new model of accident causation based
on systems theory rather than reliability theory. It consists
of two main steps: (1) Identify the potential for inadequate
control of the system that could lead to a hazardous state.
(2) Determine how each potentially hazardous control action
identified in step 1 could occur [20].
Now we describe the method in more detail. Before the
concrete safety analysis starts, we identify the accidents and
hazards at the system level. To apply STPA, we start from
the system control structure. Based on the control struc-
ture, we evaluate each control action against four general
types of hazardous behaviors: (1) a control action required
for safety is not provided; (2) an unsafe action is provided;
(3) a potentially safe control action is provided too early,
too late or out of sequence, and (4) a safe control action
is stopped too soon or applied too long. Then we derive
the initial safety requirements from the unsafe control ac-
tions. By using STPA step 2, we focus on the causal factors
for the unsafe control actions of step 1. We identify the
process model and the variables that affect the safety of
the control actions and include them in the software con-
troller in the control structure diagram to document how
each unsafe control action could occur. The process model
contains three types of variables: Internal variables of the
software controller, interaction interface variables, which re-
ceive data/command of the environmental components and
environmental variables of other components in the system
interacting with the software controller. After that, we iden-
tify detailed software safety requirements by using Boolean
operators AND and OR, to constrain the unsafe combina-
tions of process variables.
We recommend this novel technique for two reasons: (1)
The current safety analysis techniques, such as FMEA and
FTA, assume that accidents are caused by component fail-
ures, which is mostly not true for software. The primary
Figure 1: Mapping STPA in S-Scrum
advantage of STPA is that it emphasises causal factors from
the system view, such as component interaction accidents
or cognitively complex human decision-making errors. (2)
Current safety analysis techniques start from a complete de-
sign, which is not consistent to agile methodologies. STPA,
on the contrary, provides the necessary information to guide
the design process.
3.2 Software Safety Verification
The safety requirements verification method by using model
checking is the second part of the novel safety engineering
approach [5]. Based on STPA, [5] provides a link between
the safety analysis at the system level and safety verification
at the code level. The safety verification approach consist of
three steps: (1) Formulating the safety requirements using
temporal logic (LTL/CTL). (2) Modeling the source code
as input model (PROMELA) by using Modex [28]. (3) The
safety requirements specification and the input model are
verified by using the SPIN model checker [17].
Now we describe the software safety verification process in
more detail. First, by using the results of STPA, we fomulate
the corresponding software safety requirements, which have
been identified and expressed by Boolean operators. Then
we map them into a formal specification in LTL. An LTL
formula can be defined over a set of atomic propositions
(Boolean operators and temporal operators). Second, we
extract the input model for the model checker SPIN. The
input model is written in PROMELA code which is similar
to C code. We extract the input model automatically by
using Modex. Finally, the verification activities with the
SPIN model checker can be performed. Thus, we can verify
if the SPIN model of the software conforms to the software
safety requirements identified in STPA step 1 and step 2.
We adopt this method for two reasons: (1) this safety
verification method is extended from STPA, which we use
preliminary for safety analysis. (2) It can be applied at
an early stage of development on existing software. The
idea is in align with safety-guided design. (3) The proposed
methodology is appropriate for agile methods, since it can be
iterated until a software code that fulfills the software safety
requirements is reached [2]. The comprehensive safety en-
gineering approach is based so far on a V-Model software
development process [5]. Hence, we propose an agile soft-
ware development process instead.
4. S-SCRUM CONCEPT
4.1 Stage 1: STPA in S-Scrum
In this section, we integrate STPA in Safe Scrum. We
extend Safe Scrum in three aspects: (1) During each sprint
we integrate STPA as safety-guided design. (2) At the end of
each sprint, we use STPA on the product instead of a RAMS
validation. (3) We replace the final RAMS validation with
STPA. The other parts which are still kept consistent to
Safe Scrum are: (1) The environment description and the
SSRS phases 1-4 (concept, overall scope definitions, hazard
and risk analysis and overall safety requirements). (2) Test
Driven Development. (3) Safety product backlog. (4) A
safety expert. For other risk and hazard analysis during the
process, we also use STPA.
In STPA, the accidents are regarded as resulting from in-
adequate control. Thus, the control structure (architecture)
Figure 2: Safety Verification in S-Scrum
is considered as the cross point between STPA and Safe
Scrum.
As we can see from Figure 1, we start from a general
description of the environment and initial systems through
SSRS phases 1-4 of IEC 61508. An approximate safety tar-
get or safety-related targets are determined in up-front plan-
nings and story boarding in agile [21].
During each sprint, we apply STPA in development when
there is a sufficient amount of new architecture design. The
safety analysis result is regarded as a driving force for the
next architecture design.
By applying STPA step1 and step2, the unsafe control ac-
tions and the factors that could lead to violating the safety
constraints are determined. More detailed safety require-
ments are to be elicited depending on the stepwise system
design.
After each sprint, a product is created. We finally apply
STPA to it for the following reasons: (1) Getting a final
safety assessment. (2) Combining with safety verification
on the system level. (3) Driving further sprint development.
All the safety analysis activities aforementioned are exe-
cuted by a safety expert and the results are documented in
the safety product backlog.
4.2 Stage 2: Safety Verification in S-Scrum
After identifying the safety requirements by using STPA
in Safe Scrum, the S-Scrum development team designs and
develops the software code based on the safety requirements
iteratively and incrementally.
Yet, we still need to check whether the source code fulfills
the derived safety requirements. Therefore, in this section
we verify the consistency of safety requirements driving the
design decisions and the software after the design.
We use model checking in each sprint of S-Scrum following
STPA step1/step2. In parallel with the development team,
the safety expert formulates the safety requirements as LTL
specifications. After the code is produced by the develop-
ment team, the safety expert automatically translates the
software code into a PROMELA model, and then verifies
the PROMELA model with the safety requirements spec-
ifications one by one using the SPIN model checker. The
generation process is automatic, but it still needs manual
intervention. To this end, the verification report is formu-
lated as a part of the safety product backlog, which drives
the traceability of safe development during each sprint, see
Figure 2.
We apply the verification process iteratively in each sprint
of “S-Scrum”, when there are new safety requirements de-
rived from STPA and the software architecture produced.
STPA safety analysis, the safety requirements specification
and manual parts of model checking are performed by a
safety expert in the S-Scrum team. We fomulate the safety
verification report as a part of the safety product backlog
for minimizing the proceeding documents [22].
5. EXAMPLE: AIRBAG SYSTEMS
To illustrate our approach S-Scrum, we use air bag sys-
tems as an example [6]. The paper is the starting point of
S-Scrum, so we demonstrate the airbag system as a concept.
5.1 System Overview
Airbag systems are equipped as one of the safety-critical
systems in modern cars to protect the occupants from fatal
injuries. According to the ISO functional safety standard
26262, new airbag systems have to comply with ASIL D
(Automotive Safety Integrity Level D) for unintended de-
ployment of the airbag. Currently, it is only required to
comply with ASIL B. An airbag systems can be divided into
three major parts: sensors, crash evaluation and actuators.
Once an impact happens, it would be detected by acceler-
ation sensors and pressure sensors. Rollover accidents are
typically detected by roll rate sensors. Through the sen-
sor information, microcontrollers decide whether the sensed
acceleration corresponds to a crash situation or not. The
deployment of the airbags is activated if there was indeed
a critical crash. Using airbags can protect the passengers
from critical injury.
5.2 Applying S-Scrum in Airbag System De-
velopment
5.2.1 Environment and SSRS 1-4
Before STPA starts, we apply the original Safe Scrum sys-
tem engineering process performing environment description
and SSRS 1-4 to get an overall system safety goal.
System Safety Goal: During a critical crash, the airbag
system should protect the passengers from being injured.
Accident (AC.1): The occupants in the target vehicle are
injured when a traffic accident occurred.
Hazard (H.1): The airbag is not ignited even though a
critical crash occurred.
Hazard (H.2): The airbag is deployed unintentionally,
which means that it is ignited even though no crash at all
or only a non-critical crash has occurred.
Hazard (H.3): The airbag is ignited after T = 45ms.
The highest-level safety requirements transform directly
from the identified hazard for the system.
System Safety Requirements (SR.1): If a critical crash
occurred, the airbag must be ignited.
System Safety Requirements (SR.2): If there was no
crash or only a non-critical crash, the airbag must not be
ignited.
System Safety Requirements (SR.3): If a critical crash
occurred, the airbag must be ignited before T = 45ms:
The hazard and related safety requirements must be recorded
in the safety product backlog in the first sprint planning
meeting and taken as reference through out the whole de-
velopment process.
The verification of safety requirements at the system level
is performed by the STPA on the product as user acceptance
tests after the development process is finished.
5.2.2 Safety-Guided Design in Sprint
We use STPA starting with the first forming architecture
of the software code. The safety expert and development
team discuss and decide the times they will perform STPA
in the daily Scrum meetings. The process of performing
STPA is as follows:
Safety Control Structure Diagram:
We start with building the control structure of the airbag
system, see Figure 3. The control structure depicts not
only the components at a high level of airbag systems, but
also the main interconnections. There should be two micro-
controllers for decreasing the hazard of unintended airbag
deployment. Due to the same functions (one of them is for
redundancy), we integrate them into one micro-controller in
the control structure diagram. The deployment (actor) of
the airbag is secured by two protection mechanisms, the
Field Effect Transistor (FET) controls the power supply
Figure 3: Airbag System Control Structure
for the airbag squibs. The Firing Application Specific In-
tegrated Circuit (FASIC) controls the airbag squib. Only
if the control unit receive the signals from the sensors and
FET has enough electrical power, the FASIC will ignite the
airbag squib. The sensors we considered in the architecture
are: (1) two acceleration sensors and two pressure sensors
to detect front or rear crashes (x direction and -x direction
acceleration); (2) driver seat pressure sensor to detect the
present of occupants; (3) angular rate or roll rate sensors to
detect rollover accidents [6].
The input of this step is a certain amount software code
with architecture during sprint. The output is a safety con-
trol structure diagram with a process model, see Figure 3
STPA step 1: Identify Unsafe Control Actions:
Based on the control structure, we identify an example
of potentially hazardous control actions which would violate
system design constraints using STPA step1. The Unsafe
Control Actions (UCA) are formulated into four general haz-
ardous types (Providing, Not Providing, Providing too late
or too soon, Applying too short or too long), illustrated in
Table 1. Then we formulate the safety requirements from
UCAs, see Table 2.
The input of this step is the control structure diagram
with control actions. The output is the initial safety re-
quirements based on UCAs.
STPA step 2: Identify causal factors
We identity each UCA with the causal factors, which could
violate the safety requirements of each UCA from STPA step
1. For example, we focus on the UCA.1, and summarise the
possible causal factors in the process model of the micro-
controller, see Table 3.
In the micro-controller process model of the airbag sys-
tem, we formulate four types interaction interface variables
that affects the safety of these control actions: (1) acceler-
ation speed; (2) pressure intensity; (3) driver seat pressure
intensity; (4) roll rate. We determine the status of each vari-
able, which could lead to the UCA. The casual factors can
also be derived from the sensor model, as listed in Table 3.
Table 1: STPA Step 1 Unsafe Control Action
Airbag System Control Unit
Cotrol Action
(CA.)
Not
Provided
Provided
Too Soon
/Late
Too Long
/Short
Send
fire command
UCA.1: Not sending
fire command is
hazardous if there was a
critical crash. [H.1]
UCA.2: A fire command
is needlessly sent to
the FET and FASIC,
thus causing an unintended
deployment of the airbag. [H.2]
UCA.3: The fire command
for the airbag in case of
a crash is delayed,
thus causing the airbag
to be ignited too late. [H.1][H.3]
/
Table 2: Initial Safety Requirements from STPA
Step 1
Related UCAs Corresponding Safety Constrains
UCA.1
SSR.1: The airbag system
control unit shall provide
fire command when
there was a
critical crash.
UCA.2
SSR.2: The airbag system
control unit shall not send
fire command
when there was no crash
or non-critical crash.
UCA.3
SSR.3: The airbag system
control unit must send the
fire command T <= 45ms,
when there was
a critical crash.
5.2.3 Safety Requirements Verification in Sprint
Mapping safety requirements to a formal specifi-
cation
Based on the textual safety requirements in Table 2 and
connecting with the causal factors in Table 3, the safety ex-
pert in S-Scrum team, who has the experience of Modex,
translates them into a formal specification in LTL in paral-
lel with the code development process. The verification of
SSR.3 is beyond the scope of software verification. Thus, we
focus on the first two safety requirements. See examples:
SSR.1 = []((acceleration>= safe acceleration thresh-
old & & pressure intensity >= safe pressure thresh-
old & & driver state == present) -> (send fire com-
mand))
SSR.2 = []((acceleration<= safe acceleration thresh-
old | | pressure intensity <= safe pressure threshold
| | driver state == present) - > !(send fire com-
mand))
Verifying and testing of the safety requirements
After the development team built enough code, we verify
the safety requirements specification in LTL by transforming
the software code into a PROMELA input model for the
SPIN model checker. After the automatic proceedings in
the SPIN model checker, we record the results in the safety
product backlog. The safety requirements which are not
satisfied will be discussed by the S-Scrum team to further
build in and prioritization or give the reasons to remove the
requirements from the safety product backlog.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we extend Safe Scrum by integrating a
novel safety analysis and safety verification approach based
on STPA and propose a novel development process named
S-Scrum. By doing this, we can apply an agile develop-
ment process for safety-critical systems with a safety-guided
unstable architecture. First, we focus on the unstable ar-
chitectures which prevent using agile methods into safety-
critical systems. Second, we integrate a novel safety anal-
ysis method STPA for safety-guided design to confront the
changing architectures. The verification of the safety re-
quirements is performed by the model checker SPIN, which
seamlessly supports the continuous safety-critical software
development. Finally, the traditional RAMS validation in
Safe Scrum is replaced by STPA for keeping the agility in
S-Scrum. Rather than a hybrid combination between safety
standards and agile development processes, we believe that
it would be a good direction from the standpoint of the na-
ture of agile methods to solve safety-related problems.
However, we have not validated S-Scrum in a realistic
project. A student project at our institute will be started
for the continuous exploration and investigation of S-Scrum.
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